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The Free Trade Agreement: It Muddles the Law
Ronald C. Griffin*
There's a saying:
If you study the practices of a race
in the remote past, you'll understand
its actions in a complicated age.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article grapples with the Free Trade Agreement: a compact
creating a common market in goods and services between Canada and
the United States. It examines the source of North American law, feudal
England. It charts the development of that law in the United States and
Canada. It explores the legal muddle, i.e., the likely misconceptions in
contracts (bankruptcy and torts) attributable to the Agreement. It sum-
marizes these provisions of the Free Trade Agreement and predicts what
will happen to goods' and services' markets in North America.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Feudal England
Hobbes said, people were equal in their capacity to inflict misery
upon one another.' If they'd surrender some sovereignty to the state,
they could rescue time to spend on self-improvement. 2 This notion was
knitted to a primitive forest economy-a way of life dependent upon
hunting and foraging.3 When the king's deer were slaughtered wholesale
and yeomen took trees that belonged to royalty, foraging was out of
hand. Parliament promulgated death penalty statutes to punish people
for their acts.4
As time passed, these statutes, the so-called Black Acts,5 gave way
to civil methods for resolving disputes. Competing usages of forest re-
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1. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183-85 (C.B. MacPherson 8th ed. 1978)(1691). The account of
man's nature and the need for government appear in Chapters 13 and 17 of his book.
2. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 42 (1979). Hobbes states the
only way for men to get out of the state of war is to "conferre their power and strength upon one
man, or upon an assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one
will." T. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 227. This uniting for a common purpose, the mutual protection
and advancement of men's interests in a profitable setting, is given a name: "the multitude so united
in one person.., a commonwealth [and] in Latine Civitas." Id.
3. E.P. Thompson, Professor of History, Warwick University, presented lectures on customs
and common rights at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, on February 3, 10, 1988.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 206,
270, 272 (1975).
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sources were resolved in favor of suzerainty, grandeur, profit, and util-
ity.6 Some disputes were resolved by a contestant's purchase of a rival's
use or practice. 7 Property was seen as a practice or usage of forest re-
sources granted to an individual by a benevolent conqueror in the past,8
an object fashioned with a man's hands, a grant of land for services, 9 a
practice or usage a rival was willing to purchase,10 or anything bearing
demand value. 11
Promises created contracts, when they were made by royalty. 12 Re-
liance and seals affixed to writings emerged as justifications for trans-
forming mere promises into legal obligations.1 3 Specific performance was
an injured party's remedy. 14 The dominant philosophy was "all nature is
man's servant."15
In this primitive world, hunger stalked bounty; population tread
upon production; capitalism overtook subsistence economics. Adam
Smith became the sage for the age. To fight privation, he said, purge the
markets of religious dogma.1 6 Let goods flow like water. 17 The price,
with aid of demand, will find its level. 18 Bounty comes from
production. 19
Smith predicted people will be thrown together by plays of the mar-
ket, which is a good thing.20 Circumstances will drive buyers toward
sellers boasting a competitive advantage. When a vendor's wares have
been consumed, needy consumers will buy from the vendor boasting the
"next best" competitive advantage. When a seller with the least competi-
6. Thompson, supra note 3 (Feb. 3, 1988).
7. Id.
8. Id. (Feb. 10, 1988).
9. Copyholders were serfs who behaved as if they owned property outright. They were born
of a "grant of land for services." Their rights in land were conditional. Their claims had to be
proven by a written account registered in the manoral court's books. Retention of land depended
upon the grantee rendering homage or quick rent to the granting lord. Conversation with E.P.
Thompson, Professor of History, Warwick University, at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario,
Canada (Mar. 21, 1988).
10. Thompson, supra note 3 (Feb. 10, 1988).
11. Id. (Feb. 3, 1988). Professor Thompson said rival uses of forest resources (something a
competitor coveted or found a nuisance) were resolved by contract.
12. See J. COMMONS, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 216-17 (1959).
13. In an 18th century case, Lord Mansfield said the following: The intentions of the parties
are the basis for contractual liability; consideration is "evidence" of that intention; other forms of
evidence [such as seals] may be equally satisfactory. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 216. "Detrimental
Reliance" was a justification for converting a promise into an obligation. Id. at 185; see FIFOOT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 224-25 (London 1949); see
also STOUJAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW 6 (Austl. Nat'l Univ. Press 1975).
14. Berryman, The Specific Performance Damages Continuum: A Historical Perspective, 17 OT-
TAWA L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1985).
15. Thompson, supra note 3 (Feb. 10, 1988).
16. Id.; see A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 345 (U. of Chic. 24th ed. 1982).
17. Id. This is Smith's prescription for dealing with monopolies and mercantilism, an arrange-
ment and practice he regarded as harmful to the state. Id. at 33, 287.
18. Id. at 24.




tive advantage is the only person with whom one can do business, let the
buyer beware. When all the vendors behave like the one with the least
competitive advantage, let the vendors beware. There shall be no hoard-





The demand curve moves from right to left. The shift in demand is caused by (1) use value
(satisfaction) of the goods, (2) substitute goods, (3) the rate at which manufacturers (vendors) re-
plenish the supply, and (4) inventions rendering supplies obsolete. The numbers refer to sellers with
whom buyers do business.
B. Colonial North America
These ideas about property, contracts, and markets were exported to
North America. People conducted experiments based upon the teach-
ings of Hobbes and Smith. Property and contracts were hewned out of
the wilderness. 22 Practices, delineated in royal charters, were treated as
property. Competing uses of forest resources among Europeans and In-
dians were resolved on the basis of treaties, profit and utility, grandeur,
and contracts.
Americans, as distinguished from Canadians, improved upon
Smith's suggestions. Every settler had to participate in some capitalist
activity for his own good. 23 The spoils went to the victor. The van-
21. Id. at 55.
22. Thompson, supra note 3 (Feb. 10, 1988). Thompson summarized the enclosure movement,
the process by which rights and property were created. Competing usages of forest resources created
demand values for each one. People, he said, were willing to buy a rival's use to eliminate competi-
tion. We went from a common use of the wilderness to enclosure. Grandeur, profit, and utility were
used by authorities to resolve disputes. Originating in England, this process reproduced itself in
India and North America.
23. See R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
1988]
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quished got nothing.24 The government turned its back on the loser until
he pled destitution. Egalitarianism, leveling the competition playing
field, was fastened to some capitalist undertakings to ease the burden the
loser had to bear.25 Liberalism was rivetted to capitalism later on in the
nation's history to purge people of ill-gotten gain.26
The Canadian experiment, "Capitalism with a heart," insisted upon
every settlers' participation in some competitive scheme.27 The winner
was given the spoils. The loser, though, got something. For policy rea-
sons (such as the need to appease a population tempted to move to
warmer climes), the government rewarded losers for the good fight.28
Building on this past, twentieth century Canada seems to be a devel-
oping nation.29 The central government is weak.30 The population is too
small to dominate the continent. 31 Canada's industrial service center is
overshadowed by its trade with America in strategic metals and natural
resources.32  The provinces feud with one another.33  There are few
things, other than east-west trade, that hold the provinces together. 34
America, on the other hand, behaves like a post-industrial state. It
has miniaturized its traditional industries-automobiles and steel.35 It is
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 256, 266 (1985)[hereinafter HAB-
ITS OF THE HEART].
24. Id. at 32-33.
25. Id. at 255.
26. See FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY 5 (1983); HABITS OF THE
HEART, supra note 23, at 148-49.
27. Richard Simeon, Director, School of Public Administration, and Professor of Political Sci-
ence, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, presented a lecture on the Free Trade Agree-
ment (Harmonizing the Laws) at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Feb. 2, 1988);
Conservation with Michael Cormier, Director, Legal Aid, Faculty of Law, Queen's University,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Jan. 20, 1988).
28. Cormier, supra note 27.
29. Conversation with H.R.S. Ryan, Professor (Emeritus) of Legal History, Faculty of Law,
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Apr. 20, 1988).
30. A sanguine account of the central government's powers appears in an article published in
the Queen's Quarterly. Whyte, Submission to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the
House of Commons on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, 94 QUEEN'S QUARTERLY 793 (1987). The
Meech Lake Accord reconstituting the Canadian Confederation of Governments is a monument to
nursery politics. It seeks reconciliation with Quebec at the expense of nation building. Id. at 793,
795-96. It panders to the two language policies (unilingualism versus bilingualism) which compete
for domination in Canada. It regionalizes the appointment process for the upper house of Parlia-
ment (Senate) and the Supreme Court of Canada. Id. at 794, 803-04. Richard Simeon, Director,
School of Public Administration, and Professor of Political Science, Queen's University, in his
Meech Lake and Free Trade: Role and Function of Contemporary Government made a similar com-
ment in the Dean's conference on the "Meech Lake Accord," Dean's Conference on Law and Policy,
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Feb. 19, 1988).
31. Ryan, supra note 29. Conversation with T.P. Chen, Professor of International and Chinese
Law, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Apr. 13, 1988).
32. Conversation with David Haglund, Director, Institute for International Studies, Queen's
University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Mar. 29, 1988). See Valorzi, US. will buy more Canadian
electricity, study says, Whig Standard, Apr. 19, 1988, at 15, col. 3.
33. Faculty lecture presented by the Honorable Allan Blakeney, Provincial Premier of Sas-
katchewan (retired), to the Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Feb. 1,
1988).
34. Id.
35. M. HARRINGTON, NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 11 (1984); see Seaberry, First the Good
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obsessed with foreign trade.36 It is committed to wooing foreigners inter-
ested in investing in America. Investments, after all, increase the supply
of capital and lower interest rates. It makes money available to busi-
nesses committed to rebuilding plants and recapturing markets.
If climate and geography shape a group's coping mechanism, Amer-
icans appear to be an inventive lot. In commercial matters, they are tied
to legal revisionism-using any tool that hastens the process of creating
obligations out of promises. 37 When there's a crisis, they're interested in
the legal analysis that resolves most, if not all, of it. It's an up-scale
version of the way the English manufactured the common law-for every
case there's an opposite. Circumstance determines the outcome.
38
Canadians, in comparison, seem to be cautious folks. They treasure
public order as much as personal freedom. 39 In commercial matters,
they are wedded to objectivism-subduing personal freedom by way of
offer and acceptance.40 They are wedded to old-world structures and
traditions. They strive for social coherency in the midst of change.
41
They are faithful to old ideas.42 They retain a surprising amount of faith




Canadian law is cradled in an evolving culture as opposed to one
born of revolution. The people are obsessed with social coherency.
44
Lawyers are committed to putting all events into the right box.45 If an
event is an anomaly, something that does not reverberate in a legal struc-
ture, it is a matter for politics.4 6 Parliaments react to crises as they un-
fold. After a crisis has been averted, the remainder is governed by the
common law, an uncharted oral tradition providing ways for people to
bind themselves to one another.47
News: The Worst May be Over for U.S. Manufacturers, Wash. Post Nat'l (Weekly Ed.), Feb. 10,
1986, at 19, col. 3.
36. See, e.g., "Walkom," Asian Friends recoil from "ugly American policies," The Globe and
Mail, Mar. 26, 1988, at D-3, col. 6.
37. See POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 163 (6th ed. 1963).
38. See ATIYAH, THE HAMLYN LECTURES: PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 1-
53 (1987). Conversation with Donald Galloway, Professor of Law (Torts), Queen's University,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Mar. 22, 1988).
39. On March 8, 1988, Ernest J. Weinrib, Professor of Law, University of Toronto, delivered
the Catriona Gibson Lecture at Queen's Law School, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The title of the
lecture was Theology of the Law. Following the lecture, I met with Professors Weinrib and Weisberg
at which time we discussed the lecture and other Canadian issues.
40. Id.; see POUND, supra note 37, at 150.
41. POUND, supra note 37, at 150.
42. Id.
43. Id.






Canadians have a constitutive view of the law;48 law is a judgment
about the past. 49 It's composed of abstractions (like K = O+A or K= M X
C
M), strung together in patterns. 50 It contains performative terms.51 It's
something the judiciary understands.52 It deals with human
interactions.
53
Suppose there were a problem with advertising. This would be the
Canadian response. Advertising deals with human interactions such as
expressed and implied warranties. It's camped on the fringe of contract
law, because it deals with writings and utterances. If the utterance con-
tains a claim that is false, that's fraud. If an advertisement is harmful,
but it doesn't reverberate in law as it's presently constituted, that's a mat-
ter for politics. Parliament has to enact a statute to deal with this
situation.
Americans would react differently to the advertisement. As instru-
mentalists, they would latch onto the legal analysis that resolved the
problem. Law, for them, is a legislative or judicial edict which ensures
that all resources (time, money, and materials) are put to their most valu-
able use. If an advertisement urged people to engage in wasteful spend-
ing, an activity in conflict with a policy promoted by law, it would be
subject to law. If the advertisement contained a false claim, that would
be fraud. If the advertisement was deceptive, that would be actionable at
law.
To illustrate the American and Canadian perspective, let's refer to a
more traditional case like Raffles v. Wichelhaus54 in which the parties
entered into a contract for the sale of 125 bales of cotton. The cotton's
origin was Bombay, India. Its destination was Liverpool, England. The
parties agreed the goods were to be transported on a ship named Peerless,
departing Bombay for Liverpool. The seller presented the goods to the
buyer for acceptance. The buyer rejected them, claiming the Peerless he
"meant and intended" was a ship that sailed from Bombay in October
and not the one that sailed in December.55
Americans would treat the parties' conduct and writing as evidence
of an agreement. The buyer and seller had prepared a writing, specifying
what was to be sold and how it was to be transported. The writing was
signed by the parties. Furthermore, the seller had completed his
performance.
From an American perspective, the question would be whether the
buyer's performance warranted punishment under the law. If under the
48. Id. The word refers to a practice enjoying a wide consensus. See Whyte, Federal Power
Over the Economy: Finding New Jurisdictional Room, 13 CAN. Bus. L.J. 257, 271 (1987-1988).
49. Weinrib, supra note 39.
50. Id.; see Griffin, Hill's Account: Law School, Legal Education and the Black Law Student, 12
T. MARSHALL L.J. 507 (1987).
51. Samek, On Contracting, 4 DALHOUSIE L.J. 62, 66-69 (1977).
52. Weinrib, supra note 39.
53. Id.
54. 2 H.& C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).
55. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 36 (1974).
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circumstances the agreement represented the best allocation of the par-
ties' resources, and the buyer had imposed additional costs upon the
seller, the buyer would have to pay damages. According to contract law,
damages would equal "derivative reliance costs" (if any) plus lost
profits.5
6
By comparison, Canadians would express less concern about the re-
source allocation question, while acknowledging (one would suppose)
some concern about damages. Rather, they would ask how this transac-
tion registers under the law of contracts. Because there is no statute on
the subject, common law controls the case. Agreements between parties
are valid, provided the minds of the parties have met (K = M X M). If
there is evidence the parties agreed upon the subject matter, price, time,
and place for performance, they would say there was a meeting of the
minds. But because the agreement is indefinite as to the time for per-
formance, they'd reluctantly conclude it must be declared invalid.
When these ways of dealing with legal problems are mixed together,
as they undoubtedly are under the Free Trade Agreement, there's a mud-
dling of the law. Bewildered businessmen, not knowing the opponents'
frame of mind, are left wondering about what is legal and how a crisis
ought to be averted.
E. Social History
The anxiety attributed to businessmen is provoked by Canadian-
American relations and the businessmen's desire to make money in both
countries.5 7 To date, America and Canada share the longest common
border in the world. They admit to a common language and a colonial
history with England. 8 From these commonalities, the world's largest
trade relationship has emerged.
In 1985, the trade in goods between Canada and America totaled
$125 billion (U.S.).5 9 That's thirty-seven billion dollars more than the
trade between Japan and the United States, and seventeen billion dollars
more than American trade with the ten nations of the European Eco-
nomic Community.60 The Institute for International Economics pub-
lished a book featuring an account of this trading relationship.
In . . . 1984-85, Canada bought 22 percent of U.S. exports, or more
than twice as many as second place Japan .... If Canada was consid-
ered two separate countries (the first being Ontario, and the second,
the other nine provinces) Ontario would be the leading buyer of U.S.
exports, with the remaining nine provinces ranking third place ahead
56. Swinton, Foreseeability: Where Should the Award of Contract Damages Cease?, in REITER
AND SWAN'S STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 62-91 (1980).
57. 1988 Briefing Paper, US.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, at 3-3, -4 (assembled by Leitzell,
Kendall & Winfrey, Law Firm of Bogle & Gates, Washington, D.C.).





of Mexico and Britain. 6 1
If the trading relationship were examined from a Canadian perspec-
tive, it would overwhelm the analyst. Eighty percent of Canadian mer-
chandise is exported to the United States. 62 This figure looms large when
linked with the fact that exported goods constitute one-fourth of Can-
ada's gross national product.
63
Too many Americans, I suspect, might be stunned by the magnitude
of this trade. The significance of the Canadian-American embrace, how-
ever, is not overlooked by Canadians."4 Canadians feel the influence and
closeness of the United States every day. This perceived closeness is a
source of irritation for many Canadians and the principle reason for the
controversy precipitated by the Free Trade Agreement.
65
The controversy over the Free Trade Agreement comes down to
this. On the North American continent there are competing images of
the good life.66 There's the American way, "unrestrained capitalism.
67
There's the Canadian way, commitment to a system that places "a sense
of community ahead of profit."' 68 The Free Trade Agreement, the worst
fear of some, amounts to a triumph of one image over another.69 It ex-
poses a country of twenty-six million to the fancy of 241 million
Americans.
In the history of our two nations, political leaders have labored with
arrangements to normalize trade. The first trade agreement, imple-
mented in 1854, played a role in moving Canada from a colony to an
independent state.70 It covered natural products and mutual fishing
rights. 7' After the Civil War, America abrogated the treaty.
The second treaty, submitted for ratification in 1911, covered trade
in natural resources. 72 Its submission to the Canadian Parliament met
widespread opposition, fueled by a fear that Canada would become a de-
pendent of the United States. 73 This fear spread like a wild fire, fueling a
backlash against the dominant (liberal) party. In time, the backlash
swept them from office.
61. P. Wonnacott, The United States and Canada: The Quest for Free Trade, an Examination
of Selected Issues 2 (Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, Mar. 1987).
62. 1988 Briefing Paper, supra note 57, at 3-3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3-4.
66. See Burns, Canada's General Election, in Effect, A Plebiscite on Trade Pact with U.S., N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1988, at 8, col. 3.
67. Id. at col. 4.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 1988 Briefing Paper, supra note 57, at 3-4.
71. Id.; see Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation in North America, in 12 C. BEVANS, COMPI-






The third treaty and, until now, the final attempt to normalize trade
between the countries was withdrawn in 1948 by Canada. The Premier,
at that time, feared political reprisal in his government from anti-Ameri-
can elements.
74
III. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Synopsis
The Free Trade Agreement eliminates gimmicks like quotas, tariffs,
and license fees invented by governments to protect domestic industries.
Under the Free Trade Agreement, Canada promises to end the practice
of paying its farmers subsidies to sell its surplus products to Americans
at prices "below market values;"' 75 to eliminate train subsidies to compa-
nies transporting farm products to United States' markets; 76 to eliminate
tariffs on fresh fruit and vegetables coming from the United States;77 and
to remove barriers that impede the flow of energy to America.
78
America, in turn, promises to eliminate quotas on Canadian beef
and veal;79 to eliminate import license fees for Canadian wheat, oats, and
barley;80 to end the embargo on Alaskan crude oil going into Canada;8'
and to allow goods, services, and investment to flow freely across the
border (modifying laws that impede vendor personnel from following
their goods and investments).
8 2
B. Consequences
The Free Trade Agreement creates a common market. It stimulates
competition. It drives inefficient businesses from the market place. It
encourages people to think about business ventures in terms of compara-
tive advantage (specialization), competitive advantage, and profits.
It imposes the American mechanism for dealing with hunger and
privations upon all of North America. It rolls back government interfer-
ence with competition, facilitating private arrangements like spot mar-
keting and subsidized price wars between businesses, which circumvent
competition. By encouraging north-south trade as opposed to trade with
the provinces, it destabilizes Canada. It muddles the law, destroying and
reshaping the legal cultures of the two countries.
74. Id.
75. Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America [hereinafter
FTA] art. 701 (explanatory note), in THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (CANADA) art.
701 (explanatory note), at 75 (1988).
76. Id.
77. Id., art. 702 (explanatory note), at 75.
78. Id., art. 905 (explanatory note), at 142-43.
79. Id., art. 704 (explanatory note), at 76.
80. Id., art. 705 (explanatory note), at 76.
81. Id., art. 902.5 (explanatory note), at 141.




In the new market created by the Free Trade Agreement, the de-
mand curve will swing to the left and to the right. Movement will be
dictated by an object's residual "use value" (as determined by the pub-
lic's willingness to spend money on it) and by patented inventions that
make existing objects obsolete. Vendors (assumed in Illustration II) will
form a line on the supply curve in accordance with their greatest or least
competitive advantages. Buyers will engage sellers on the basis of adver-







The competitive advantages, such as cost of plant, equipment, raw
materials, and talent, will determine the business victims of wild swings
in the demand curve. Vendors will pad their advantages to avoid expul-
sion from the market by moving to favorable tax havens.8 3 Some will
yield to advertising to smother a competitor's claim that one country has
better products than the other.8 4 If a market is saturated with goods, the
least competitive firm will use advertising to woo a competitor's cus-
tomer to itself 81
From a technical point of view, when the cost of production exceeds
gross receipts, vendors will buy competitors and slow their plant produc-
tion to stimulate demand. Some will buy businesses engaged in profitable
but unrelated activity. 6 Others, while managing new acquisitions, will
buy advertising to woo its competitor's customers to itself 8 7 A few will
use spot markets to inflate a product's price. Others, if they can get away
83. See Bale, The Treasury's Proposals for Tax Reform: A Canadian Perspective, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 161 (Autumn 1985).
84. See J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION 4, 82 (1967).
85. Id. at 14-16, 54-56. When you're confronted with generic products, brand (differentiation)
dominance can be eroded by subtle things like time and special displays in a store, the consumer's
desire for change, a friend's recommendation, or the discovery that a preferred brand is out of stock.
If a company owns several brands, shifts in brands mean brand loyalty is very weak. Id. at 56. Such
a situation invites advertising. It provides marginal companies with an opportunity to gather
customers.
86. Id. at 49, 50.
87. Id. at 50.
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with it, will start a subsidized price war to get rid of competition. All
will cite competition and portray these practices as the only way to serve
a "residual demand" for something as reasons for excluding the govern-
ment from squabbles between competitors.
D. Spot Marketing
Spot marketing, a clever contrivance, is a way to alter a price to
maximize profits. The price of a product is the sum of the cost of pro-
duction, rent, and profits.8 8  Cost encompasses long-range fixed costs
(taxes, equipment, and maintenance of plant) and average variable costs
(transportation, labor, energy, and materials).
Assume, for the moment, a buyer pays a price that includes a cost
for transportation from a distant plant. If the seller ships the goods to
the buyer from a nearby plant, the transportation cost looms as an
unearned profit (a sign that a firm has circumvented competition).
89
If Americans market their goods in Canada under such a pricing
scheme, Canadians will have to deal with the practice under its competi-
tion statutes (if there is one on the subject), 90 or the Free Trade Agree-
ment provision on disputes which may not be applicable, or some other
arrangement which consumes time and money. 9'
E. Price Wars
Price wars are subtle ways to trim competition in targeted markets.
88. See G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 23, 32 (1981); Griffin, Wealth and Poverty (Book
Review), 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 741 (1982).
89. Base point pricing is a species of "delivery pricing." Under this scheme, the seller uses one
or more of its plants as a reference point for the calculation of freight charges. Base point pricing
can lead to "phantom freight" (a way to note anticompetitive activity). Corn Prods. Refining Co. v.
F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726, 728-31, 738-39 (1945).
In a Canadian context, base pointing refers to a transportation cost that reflects the price from
the closest place of production to customer, which may mean a rival's plant if it's the closest facility.
If rivals use F.O.B. destination contracts, one of them might exact an attractive freight charge (from
a nearby rival's plant) to attract new customers. Market Law and the Competition Act-Practical
Problems Confronting Corporate Council, in 1987 ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON CONTINUING LEGAL ED-
UCATION, CAN. (ONTARIO) B. Ass'N 46. In all likelihood, the rival will retaliate. Each will subsi-
dize their deliveries out of profits made from nearby customers (other resources) to keep or recover
customers. When the price war proves to be too exhausting, the parties might drift to an agreement
to standardize the prices.
When the market's price is competitive, competition regarding freight charges can produce con-
spiracies to stabilize prices, which are condemned by §§ 52 and 53 of the Canadian Competition Act.
Davidson, Delivery Prices Under the New Competition Act, 7 CAN. COMPETITION POLICY REC. 59
(1986). The parties might agree to prices for different delivery zones which may not reflect the cost
of freight from plant to customer. Id. 59-60.
90. There are no cases on this in Canada. Conversation with Tom Asplund, Professor of Law
(Competition Law), Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (May 6, 1988).
91. The dispute provisions cover conflicting interpretations of the Free Trade Agreement, coun-
tervailing duties, and antidumping issues. Free Trade Agreement, chs. 18, 19 (explanatory note), at
258-60, 267-70. Zuijdwijk, Dispute Settlement Mechanism Under the Free Trade Agreement, 40 ME.
L. REV. 325 (1988). In 1984, America and Canada made an agreement covering antitrust issues.
Canada/U.S. Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperation
with respect to the application of National Antitrust Laws (Mar. 1984), reprinted in 23 INT'L. L.
MATS. 275 (1984).
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The trick is to get consumers in one market to subsidize a firm's decision
to sell goods in another market at sums below market prices. Illustration
III represents a targeted market. LAVC represents "long-range average
variable costs." LATC represents "long-range average total costs."
LAFC represents "long-range average fixed costs." The peaks and
troughs in the market price occur on an axis where the LAVC and LATC







This is a picture presentation of the Areeda-Turner Test. It's the setting in which analysts plot
price wars. D. Gifford & L. Raskin, Federal Anti-Trust Law: Cases and Materials 404-05 (1983).
When firm X drops its price between the points where the curves
intersect ($6.75), the presumption is that X has started- a price war. Peo-
ple will say X has acted competitively to lure Y's customers to itself.
When Y, thereafter, drops its price to $4.50, the presumption is that Y
has acted competitively to recover customers it has lost to X.
When X and Y drop their prices below the lowest point where the
MC and LAVC curves intersect, it is presumed the parties have acted
suspiciously. Some will assert the parties have succumbed to the tempta-
tion to establish a monopoly at the expense of competition and will allege
the parties are waging a competitive war against the market's rules. X
and Y have to find an explanation the judiciary will accept (e.g., this war
is the only way to salvage a market where there's a residual demand for
what a single manufacturer can produce).
F. Cautionary Note
Canadian economic arrangements invite parliamentary intervention
to serve and protect the public.92 The subject matter, whether provincial
92. In trade and commerce, federal (provincial) powers are both split and indeterminate. On
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regulation of potash or a violation of the Federal Competition Act, deter-
mines who will intervene. 93 When a province adopts a regulation per-
taining to a provincial resource pulling the demand curve to a near
inelastic state, Parliament (Ottawa) can enjoin the administration of that
regulation, provided the resource is sold interprovincially (Illustration
IV) or in international trade.94 In Canada, some level of government is
authorized to deal with business (provincial) practices threatening the
public. 95 If a business is the offender, government has the option to warn






The solid line is a normal demand curve. The dotted line is an inelastic demand curve. The
arrow symbolizes the pull of the normal demand curve to the left.
The Free Trade Agreement will destroy this scheme to make room
for a free-standing, free enterprise, government noninterventionist ar-
one level, the trade and commerce provision, § 91(2) of the British North America Act, permits
Parliament to regulate businesses engaged in interprovincial commerce. John Deere Plow Co. v.
Wharton, [1914] A.C. 330, 340, 18 D.L.R. 353, 360 (P.C.); A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can. (Canada Stan-
dard Trade Mark Case), [1937] A.C. 405, 417, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 702, 704; see Whyte, supra note 48,
at 272-87.
93. See Central Can. Potash Co. v. Government of Sask. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 609, (1979) 1
S.C.R. 42; Regina v. Wetmore & A.-G. Ont. (1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (1983) 2 S.C.R. 284; see also
Finkelstein, Constitutional Law-Section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867-Competition Legisla-
tion, 62 CAN. B. REV. 182 (1982). Labatt Breweries of Can. v. A.-G. Canada (1979), 110 D.L.R.
(3d) 594, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, put an interesting slant on Parliamentary Power. Provincial power
amounts to what Parliament (Ottawa) can't regulate. A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 355,
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 684 (P.C.).
94. Whyte, supra note 48, at 286 (citing Canadian Indus. Gas & Oil (CIGOL) v. Government
of Sask. (1977), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 449 (1978) 2 S.C.R. 545; Central Can. Potash Co. v. Government of
Sask. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (1979) 1 S.C.R. 42). Whyte, supra note 48, at 290-291, paints a
picture of parliamentary power as regards international trade.
95. See Whyte, supra note 48, at 272-87.
96. See ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, INTERIM REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, ch. 2,
at 37 (July 1969)[hereinafter ECONOMIC INTERIM REPORT].
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rangement (Illustration II). There's no law for it in Canada except those
acts perceived by Parliament to be necessary to implement the Free
Trade Agreement. Relying upon constitutive theory or some pull of the
demand curve, Parliament can fashion acts to regulate goods sold
internationally.
97
There is another dimension to this competition business that
Canadians may have overlooked. It's the acquisition and use of intellec-
tual property (new technologies, organizational schemes, and synthetic
materials and goods). Any decision to employ something new on the
supply curve will render existing goods obsolete, depress the profits of
rivals, or drive a poorly organized vendor from the market.98 How a
lucky vendor uses something new is a matter of some importance. Can-
ada has statutes on the subject, 99 but they're shorn of case law
development.
Assume, for the moment, A and B are widget vendors commanding
business vistas (on a supply curve) that are the envy of competitors. A is
a patent owner who occupies fifty percent of the market. B is a patent
infringer, occupying thirty percent of the market. What remains,
roughly twenty percent, is divided about equally between fifteen price-
cutting competitors. While sitting around the corporate conference ta-
ble, discussing possible formulae for the settlement of an impending in-
fringement suit, A says to 1: 100
You're a responsible company ... (pause) . . . not one of those
price cutters. Those guys ... their discount schemes and price cutting
maneuvers... (pause) .... Nothing but antics .... Keeps the market
unsettled.
I've been thinking about this... I mean.., the price cutters and
the infringement business. I'm going to license my potential cost-cut-
ting widget maker (the latest rage) to all applicants for twenty years.
How about that as a settlement of our differences? Twenty percent
royalties on the first million, ten percent royalties on the second, one
percent thereafter on annual sales ... (pause). I assume you can sell
twenty million units? That amounts to ... you'll have to pay an aver-
age royalty of about 2.4% ... something like $480,000. That's a fair
settlement of our differences (smile). The machine will cut your prod-
uct cost by a third. What do you say ... (smile).
B ponders the offer then accepts it. A and B are happy with the
97. The question presented is whether Parliament's legislative output will be enough. Whyte
alludes to Constitutive Theory (as an interim answer) in his Federal Powers Over the Economy work.
Whyte, supra note 48, at 271.
98. If an invention improves cross elasticity of demand (price-wise, making an alternative good
attractive), some vendor is bound to be hurt. See EcONOMIC INTERIM REPORT, supra note 96, ch. 2,
at 32.
99. Feltham, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law in Canada,
12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 149 (1987).
100. This is an embellished version of a problem prepared by Tom Arnold and others for a
conference entitled "Competition and Dispute Resolution in the North American Context." Ar-
nold, Lundell, Schoeder & Cook, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition
Law in the North American Context, 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121, 125-26 (1987).
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arrangement. The price cutters are distraught. The cutters can neither
pay the twenty percent royalty rate (it will drive them out of business)
nor afford a lawsuit challenging the contract between A and B.
From a Canadian perspective, there are two issues to consider: con-
tracts and threats to competition. To begin the analysis, there is a con-
tract within a contract. There's a licensing agreement and a contract
sporting a promise to forebear a legal claim for a promise to rent pat-
ented machinery. The validity of these agreements will be determined by
provincial law. 101 The promises amount to consideration. They carry
demand value. They would certainly pass any benefit or detriment test.
Renting equipment for money shouldn't raise any legal eyebrows. The
tougher issue questions the impact the licensing agreement will have
upon competition in the widget market.
Is it the agreement or the performance contemplated under the
agreement that is threatening? Should we analyze performance under
the Canadian Patent Act? Who will litigate the matter? Do we have
some cases on this? Should we use the Canadian Competition Act?
What is the remedy? If the patent infringer is an American doing busi-
ness in Canada, should the remedy be shaped by the Free Trade
Agreement?
IV. MUDDLED LAW
Binational panel inspections of a nation's decisions in the name of
trade harmonization will have the unintended effect of muddling each
country's laws. 102 Trade issues will have a saluatory effect upon judicial
decision making. A few cases will illustrate what might happen.
A. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors10 3
Henningsen bought an automobile for his spouse. The dealer was
Bloomfield Motors. The parties conducted a discussion about the car
Henningsen ultimately purchased. Henningsen was presented with a
standard form contract, which he signed. A clause in the form abolished
the implied warranty of merchantability. Another clause granted him an
expressed warranty-a guarantee that the manufacturer would care for
any defect presented to it within 4000 miles or ninety days after the car
had been delivered to the buyer.
101. Id. at 122 n.7.
102. Joint Lectures on Remedies and Administrative Practices under the Free Trade Agreement,
presented by Professors Noel Lyon (Faculty of Law, Queen's University) and David Haglund (Di-
rector, Queen's Institute for International Studies) at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Can-
ada (Mar. 29, 1988). But see Cluchey, Despute Resolution Provisions of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. REV. 335 (1988); Trakman, Privatizing Dispute Resolution Under
the Free Trade Agreement: Truth or Fancy?, 40 ME. L. REV. 349 (1988).
103. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d. 69 (1960).
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All the manufacturers, including the one who made Henningsen's
car, used the same form. All the forms contained the same clauses.
Bloomfield presented the clauses to Henningsen without pointing them
out, spending time to explain them, or seeking Henningsen's acknowl-
edgment that he understood what had been explained to him.
First of all, assume the car was made in Detroit and a Canadian
purchased the car in Ontario, Canada, and drove it to the United States.
Assume further, the car broke down in Kansas, inflicting injury upon
Henningsen's wife, and the buyer's wife sued the manufacturer in
Michigan.
If all the manufacturers using this form account for most of the
vehicle registrations in Canada, what, if anything, would the Michigan
court say about the clause abolishing the implied warranty of mer-
chantability or about the clause limiting the vendor's duties? How would
a Canadian organize this case? What advice would American counsel
give him? How would the judiciary resolve the complaint against the
Michigan manufacturer?
Canadians would examine the facts to determine whether the action
sounds in tort or contract. They would say contract should provide the
victim with a remedy. If she can't get a remedy from that realm, tort
should provide her with something to exact retribution from the defend-
ant.104 Technically speaking, "proximity of a good to an injury" would
create a presumption of negligence.105 Negligence (breach of a duty to
use the safest design and manufacturing techniques) is another way of
describing substandard conduct, encompassing what retailers, wholesal-
ers, and manufacturers do with consumer products.
There's a nexus between the good (automobile) and Henningsen's
injury, creating a presumption of negligence. The manufacturer has to
demonstrate that he used the safest manufacturing and design tech-
niques. To avoid liability, he has to prove "intervening cause" or the
plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Taking the location of Henningsen's injury into account (Kansas),
104. See Blom, Evolving Relationship Between Contract and Tort, 10 CAN. Bus. L.J. 258 (1985).
Under the law of obligations, reliance would separate contracts from torts (privity would loom in
both categories). If the defendant (Bloomfield) had created an expectation upon which the plaintiff
relied to her detriment, she would get a remedy in torts. Injury would trigger a run of the statute of
limitations. The measure of damages would encompass costs (sums spent to repair the injury) and
reliance (sums spent as a result of an expectation engendered by the defendant).
On the other hand, if a promise was purchased with "consideration," plaintiff (not in this case)
would be provisioned with a contracts remedy. Damages would amount to "loss of expectation" and
consequentials. See Reiter, Contracts, Torts, Relations and Reliance, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT
LAW 236-311 (1980).
105. This notion appears in an unpublished manuscript by Professor Donald Galloway (Faculty
of Law, Queen's University) entitled Reconceiving the Law of Negligence, at 11, 15, 16, 19. The
phrase in the text emerged from a conversation with the author on March 22, 1988. Professor
Ernest Weinrib used similar language to express this sentiment, see supra note 39, and alluded to this
in his faculty seminar on March 8, 1988.
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the manufacturer has to contend with something called strict liability. 0 6
When or if the defendant puts defective goods into the stream of com-
merce, he's liable to the consumer for damages.
In comparison, the Americans would reject contract law as a rem-
edy, because the goods were purchased in Canada. 0 7 They wouldn't
show much enthusiasm for negligence, because it operates where there's
a clear cut relationship between plaintiff and defendant. 08 Regarding
strict liability, they'd urge caution, because the goods weren't distributed
in American commerce. They'd cast around for American and Canadian
policies the law tries to promote. If the defendant's conduct was in con-
flict with one of these policies (putting safe goods on the market), the law
promoting that policy would become the basis for a lawsuit.
The American would say a tort is a negative act, a deliberate deci-
sion to do nothing in an area where a person is obliged to act. Plaintiffs
should be granted a remedy when:
(a) they can't be appeased in contract;
(b) the tort remedy is the only way to get defective goods off the
market;
(c) the tort remedy has the effect of harmonizing the product stan-
dards (under the Free Trade Agreement) between Canada and
the United States;
(d) defendants can bear the loss better than plaintiffs; oir
(e) the contract (limiting the defendant's liability in tort) omits one
remedy.
In this case, the injured plaintiff is a Canadian. The good is Ameri-
can. The plaintiff seeks a remedy for damages caused by an American
good in Kansas. Plaintiff can't recover in contract, because privity of
contract is a defense.' 0 9 A decision in tort might have the effect of har-
monizing the product standard laws of the two countries, assuring every-
one that American manufacturers will put safe goods on the market.
Assuming the plaintiff can prove the car was defective at the time of
the injury, she's entitled to a remedy. The theory would be strict liabil-
ity. The defendant would have to show the car wasn't "unreasonably
dangerous."
The American court would pounce upon the clauses disclaiming the
implied warranty of merchantability and limiting the vendor's liability.
106. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc. 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987); Lester v.
Magic Chef Inc., 230 Kan. 643; 641 P.2d 353 (1982)(Prager, J., dissenting).
107. Because the contract was made in Canada, privity of contract would be a defense. See
Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Ins. Corp., [1932] S.C.R. 22, affirmed, [1933] A.C. 70.
108. Weinrib, supra note 39.
109. Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (1980) 2 S.C.R.
228; Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Ins. Corp., [1932] S.C.R. 22, affirmed, [1933] A.C. 70; see
Tweedle v. Atkinson (1861), 1 B & S 393, 121 E.R. 762 (Q.B.); Dunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v.
Selfridge & Co., [1915] A.C. 847 (H.L.).
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The conduct of the parties, it would say, establishes a contract. The
seller secured a concession from Henningsen-a promise to do nothing
about suing the manufacturer (dealer) for breach of warranty. The prob-
lem with the concession, however, is the dearth of evidence to prove
Henningsen was aware of the concessions he had made. The seller,
Bloomfield, didn't spend time explaining the concessions to Henningsen.
There's no evidence Henningsen acknowledged he understood the expla-
nation the seller had given him. Hence, under these circumstances, the
minds of the parties hadn't met.110 Under the meeting of the minds the-
ory, the clause abolishing warranty would be invalid."1
Contracts, or so it seems, are a result of the bartering system, people
trading valuable things. What you get, in terms of goods, is dictated by
the merchants the market foists upon you. If the public consumes sup-
plies provided by a manufacturer (dealer) boasting a competitive advan-
tage, needy consumers go to persons boasting the "next best" competitive
advantage. When all that's left is the least competitive manufacturer, the
buyer should beware. If all the manufacturers behave like the least com-
petitive manufacturer, let the vendors beware. If objectionable clauses
are imposed upon consumers by all manufacturers, they should be de-
clared void in America and Canada. In the market created by the Free
Trade Agreement, buyers should have the option (freedom) to buy goods
without objectionable clauses in contracts.
The Free Trade Agreement, the American court would say, is the
law of the land. This court is bound to make decisions that complement
the agreement concluded with Canada. There's the strict liability stan-
dard (Kansas) and a tort duty (imposed upon manufacturers doing busi-
ness in Canada) to warn the people about dangers posed by a consumer's
use of specially designed vehicles. If the manufacturer did nothing to
disclose known dangers at the time of purchase, he's negligent. If the
manufacturer's negligence caused or contributed to Mrs. Henningsen's
injuries, she's entitled to a remedy.
It does matter which law is applied in this case, Canadian or Ameri-
can. Whatever law we choose, it will have the effect of harmonizing the
law between the two countries regarding the safety of goods sold in
North America. " 2
110. See G. GILMORE, supra note 55, at 211-45. "K = M X M" is the algebraic way to express
the meeting of the minds theory.
111. See Tilden Rent-A-Car v. Clendenning, (1978) 18 O.R. (2d) 601, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400
(C.A.); see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 3 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)(the court comes as
close as it could to this position).
112. The New Jersey Supreme Court awarded the buyer damages for breach of warranty because
the car was unsuitable for ordinary use. Damages were awarded to the buyer's spouse. Id. at 416-
17, 161 A.2d at 100-01. Beyond contract damages, the buyer received damages for loss of consor-
tium with his wife. Id. at 417, 161 A.2d at 101-02.
If this case had been decided in Canada, the court might have followed Davidson v. Three
Spruce Realty Ltd. (1977) 6 W.W.R. 460, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (B.C.C.A.).. In Ontario, the court
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B. In re Timbers113
Debtor obtained funds from an investment bank. The bank ob-
tained concessions from the debtor, namely a promise to repay the loan
with interest, an assignment of rents, and a surrender of unencumbered
collateral (to be encumbered, foreclosed upon, and sold in the event of
the debtor's breach). The debtor was unable to make his payments and
the bank foreclosed upon its lien. The debtor, thereafter, filed a petition
in bankruptcy to prevent the bank from exacting revenge against the
property.
The bank argued it had purchased the right to foreclose upon and
sell the property in the bargaining process and the Bankruptcy Act ar-
rested his freedom (the right to reduce property to cash and invest the
same profitably). Assuming the claimant bank is Canadian, how would
its lawyers approach the case? What advice would an American col-
league give them? When the case got to court, what would the bank-
ruptcy court say on the subject?
Canadian lawyers would unpackage the law of contracts-the com-
mon law ceremonies, notions like consideration and promise. They'd
note that the facts resonated under the Free Trade Agreement (financial
services) and under the law governing the debtor-creditor relationship.
The Free Trade Agreement, they'd say, formalizes a Canadian bank's
right to sell financial services to American businesses.' 4 The Agree-
ment, they'd go on to say, covers the structure of Canadian banks operat-
ing in America and their activities (securities and retail banking
would have used the reasonable expectations of the buyer to define the seller's duties. See Reiter &
Swan, Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable Expectations, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW § 1,
at 8 (Rieter & Swan eds. (1980)). If the seller had used a form contract, the buyer's expectations
would have been defined by the items the seller had reduced to fine print. If the fine print items were
concealed from the buyer (never mentioned to him), the seller couldn't use them as a defense in a
contract action. Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning, (1978) 18 O.R. (2d) 601, 83 D.L.R. (3d)
400 (C.A.); see also Delaney v. Cascade River Holidays Ltd., (1983) 44 B.C.L.R. 24, 24 C.C.L.T. 6
(C.A.).
In contracts, Canadians are obsessed with establishing a "level playing" field before the parties
make mutual promises. If the parties had come to the deal with unequal bargaining power, an
objectionable clause like a limitation of liability clause would have been invalid. The judge would
review the testimony of the defendant before coming to this decision. He'd ask the following
questions.
Judge: Did you (defendant) urge the plaintiff to sign standard form contract?
Defendant: Yes.
Judge: Did you say nothing about reading it?
Defendant: Yes.
Judge: Did you provide the plaintiff with soothing assurances during bargaining?
If each answer was yes, the objectionable clause would be invalid. Davidson v. Three Spruce
Realty Ltd., (1977) 6 W.W.R. 460, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (B.C.C.A.).
The FTA would not force a court to do anything like this. A decision which did not take the
Treaty into account, however, would undermine what the politicians have tried to promote between
the countries (livelier business competition between rivals and higher quality goods and services for
Americans and Canadians).
113. 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986).
114. FTA, supra note 75, art. 1702 (explanatory note), at 249, 251.
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operations).115 Although the agreement says nothing specific about each
country's laws regarding secured transactions and mortgages, it is as-
sumed Canadian plaintiffs are entitled to equal treatment under Ameri-
can laws.
If there was an agreement permitting the Canadian bank to subject
the "demand value" of certain property to a claim, and the agreement
was reduced to writing, signed, and registered with the state, the debtor
would be obliged to surrender the property to the bank. The bank would
be obliged to get as much money out of the property as it could to retire
the debt.11 6 From a Canadian perspective, the Bankruptcy Act shouldn't
be used by the debtor to stop the bank (a secured creditor) from selling
the property. 
17
After listening to the arguments proposed by the Canadians, Ameri-
can counsel, in turn, would cast around for laws or policies dealing with
the bank's desperate situation. Some American lawyers, he'd say to
Canadian counsel, would utter little about the claim, contending that
they couldn't do much without an examination of the writing between
the parties; or that the claims weren't governed by the traditional laws of
contracts. A few would assert the bank's claim was suspicious, having
inadequately described the right frustrated by the Bankruptcy Act.
Others would contend that the right to gouge one's claim out of encum-
bered collateral was purchased under the mortgage;" l8 and that the bank-
ruptcy statute wrongfully took that right (property) from the bank." 9
The bankruptcy court would pounce upon the last notion, citing sec-
tions of the American Bankruptcy Act that protect a secured creditor's
rights. It would then drift to the Free Trade Agreement, citing language
that orders Americans to accord equal treatment to Canadians doing
business in the United States. The court would acknowledge that a Ca-
nadian creditor bank could sell this property under the Canadian Bank-
ruptcy Act.120 While a trustee could do little to frustrate the wishes of a
secured creditor (where a claim was greater than the property's demand
value), American law stops secured creditors from taking such action. 121
115. Id.
116. See GERTNER, SPRINGMAN, McGUINNESS, MORRISON, STEWART & LASKIN, DEBTOR
AND CREDITOR: CASES AND COMMENTARY 848-49 (3d ed. 1987); Robertson, The Problem of Price
Adequacy in Foreclosure Sales, 66 CAN. B. REV. 671 (1987).
117. Re Brodie (1984), 51 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81 (Ont. S.C.); Re Hallmac Ltd. (1973), 1 O.R. (2d)
143, 19 C.B.R. (N.S.) 80, 39 D.L.R. (3d) 511 (H.C.).
118. Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d. 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Ameri-
can Mariner Ind., Inc., 734 F. 2d. 426 (9th Cir. 1984); see In re Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1380, 1397 (5th
Cir. 1986).
119. Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1383. Timbers supplies an account of the cases on this issue. Id. at
1380, Syl. 2, 1382 n.1, 1405.
120. E.g., Re Dunham (1981), 40 C.B.R. (N.S.) 25; Re Brodie (1984), 51 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81 (Ont.
S.C.).




The American Bankruptcy Act recognizes a creditor's property in-
terest in encumbered collateral; it doesn't take it from him. Rather, it
postpones the day when a creditor can gouge his claim out of encum-
bered property. Sections 361 and 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, for example, provide secured creditors with an interim remedy when
the demand value of encumbered collateral depreciates or is threatened
with injury.1 22 It provides a final remedy (cash and promissory notes)
after a plan to reorganize a business has been confirmed by a bankruptcy
court. 123
When and if the bank produces a recorded mortgage, it will be given
the demand value of encumbered property in bankruptcy. If the credi-
tor's claim is a request for extra compensation (for the lost opportunity
to make money), extra compensation won't be allowed under the Act. 
124
V. SUMMARY
The Free Trade Agreement formalizes an unwritten understanding
that Canada and America are economically related. It erects a new mar-
ket, the North American Common Market. It puts pressure on each
country's courts to ponder the other country's laws while crafting opin-
ions. It hastens the day, finally, when lawmakers will harmonize the
laws.
In this new market, contracts will be seen as a cloak shrouding
layers of perception. Lawyers will have to unpackage that law to find
something, like offer and acceptance or notions about consideration and
reliance, to make sense of transborder encounters between businessmen.
Enforceable bargains will emerge from the conversations between the
122. Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1399; see Bankruptcy Reform Act, II U.S.C.A. 362(d)(1) (West Supp.
1989).
123. Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1385.
124. Id. Timbers was decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. It concluded the option to
use encumbered collateral profitably, i.e., to liquidate an asset and reinvest the proceeds, wasn't a
compensable loss of property meriting adequate protection. Id. at 1416; cf. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d
388 (8th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court seized an opportunity to review the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal's decision. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988). In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. Id.
at 630-3 1.
If this case had surfaced in Canada, the Bankruptcy Act would guide the trustee's actions.
Generally speaking, secured creditors are provisioned with a right to gouge payment (satisfy a debt)
out of property owned by the debtor. If a creditor has done what's required of him to obtain a
secured claim, the trustee must relinquish control over the property when the secured creditor re-
quests it. Re Brodie, (1984), 51 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81 (Ont. S.C.). The trustee can resist a request for
control, provided he files a timely pleading in a provincial court and proves the debtor has equity in
the property sought by the secured creditor. Id.
The FTA wouldn't mandate an American bankruptcy court or, indeed, a provincial (Canadian)
superior court to do anything. Yet, ignoring the trade pact would undermine a goal the politicians
have tried to promote between the countries, that of livelier transborder financial services. See Wil-
son, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in Issues Brief, Congressional Research Service, at CRS-8
(Aug. 19, 1988)(Order Code IBB87173); Congressional Research Service, Summary of the US.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, at 33-34 (Feb. 1988)(IP-3956-BU). A decision that was unmindful
of the pact would make it difficult for Canadian creditors (financial institutions) to calculate the risks
of doing business in America.
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parties and from their correspondence and written agreements. The duty
to maintain a stable business relationship, such as good faith or a duty to
perform promised acts, will be built upon the parties' speech, conduct,
and correspondence. Breach of these duties will give rise to damages
based upon the sum a plaintiff was provoked to spend.
The flurry of activity, prompted by the Free Trade Agreement, will
produce a continental law-a way to bridge different cultures without
bruising their domestic laws and practices. All this will dawn upon us in
the area of financial services and in long-term installment and require-
ment contract cases.
If law is a way to allay fears, this law, both bargain and obligation
law, will inculcate a desire in people "inter se" to cooperate. Yet this
law, I fear, will disarm critical thinking. It will lull people into the habit
of devaluing each other's belief system, which determines, more often
than not, how laws are applied to people. It will mask the decision to
replace Canadian governmental regulation of business with the American
market mechanism. It will create a legal choir who will whine about or
undo (privatize) the mission of crown corporations. It will erode each
nation's folkways, fuzzing the differences between Canada and America.
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